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Note
Venerunt, Viderunt, Vicerunt Venue: How TC
Heartland and In re Cray Have Conquered
Patent Venue for Corporate Defendants and How
Congress Can Balance the Scales of Patent Venue
Justice
Peter Estall
Cray Inc., a supercomputing company, sold $345 million
worth of supercomputers through a single sales rep who lived in
the Eastern District of Texas.1 Raytheon, believing the supercomputers infringed its patents, filed an infringement action in
the Eastern District against Cray.2 Cray moved to transfer
venue to the Western District of Wisconsin, arguing that, under
the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (hereinafter
§ 1400(b)),3 the Eastern District was not a proper venue because
Cray neither “reside[d]” nor had a “regular and established place
of business” there.4 The district court denied the motion to transfer, ruling that Cray did have a “regular and established place of
 J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Minnesota Law School. I would like
to thank the Honorable Susan Richard Nelson of the District of Minnesota for
providing the impetus for my research into this topic. Thank you also to the
extraordinary efforts of the editors and staff of Volumes 102 and 103 of Minnesota Law Review, without whom this Note could not exist. Thanks especially to
Joseph Janochoski, Taylor Mayhall, Franklin Guenthner, David Hahn, Joshua
M. Greenberg, Tony Ufkin, Frances Fink, and Torie Abbott Watkins for their
insightful comments, without which this Note would not be coherent. Thanks to
the wonderful managing department, especially Mel Pulles, Melanie Johnson,
Karthik Raman, Seung Sub Kim, and Alec Minea for making sure that this Note
is substantively and mechanically accurate (any remaining mistakes are, of
course, mine and mine alone). Thanks to Professor Brad Clary for his guidance
throughout the process as well. Finally, a heartfelt thank you to my parents,
John Estall and Shirley Boyd for always keeping me grounded and encouraging
me when I need it. Copyright © 2019 by Peter Estall.
1. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
2. Id.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012).
4. See id. § 1400(b) (providing that venue is proper in districts where the
defendant either “resides” or has a “regular and established place of business”);
Cray, 871 F.3d at 1357–58.
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business” in the Eastern District through its sales representative.5 Cray, frustrated with the overly permissive venue regime
established by the district court,6 filed for a writ of mandamus
with the Federal Circuit, arguing that the district court interpreted the scope of § 1400(b) too broadly.7 The reverberations of
that mandamus proceeding have been heard far beyond the case
at issue: Where, in the digital age, when companies are doing
business in a radically different manner from a century ago, do
companies have their “place of business”? And what role do people who work for the company, but are not necessarily employees, play in establishing such a place of business?8
The patent venue statute, § 1400(b), has a long and complex
history.9 For the past thirty years, § 1400(b) permitted a huge
number of patent suits to accumulate in only a few districts
around the country, particularly the Eastern District of Texas.10
A patent defendant could be sued in any district where the court
had personal jurisdiction over the defendant,11 a standard that
permitted excessive attempts at forum shopping and led to massive filings in inconvenient or patent-plaintiff-friendly districts,
particularly the Eastern District of Texas.12 Filings were high in
the Eastern District; it had been viewed as an attractive forum
5. Cray, 871 F.3d at 1358.
6. See infra Part I.C.1.
7. See Cray, 871 F.3d at 1358.
8. The primary example used in this Note is transportation provider Uber.
Uber is perhaps the quintessential new technology company, hiring drivers as
contractors, not employees, in hundreds of cities across the globe. One major
question addressed in this Note is whether those drivers (and their cars) constitute a “regular and established place of business” in their respective cities under
§ 1400(b).
9. See Richard C. Wydick, Venue in Actions for Patent Infringement, 25
STAN. L. REV. 551, 551–63 (1973).
10. See Kaleigh Rogers, The Small Town Judge Who Sees a Quarter of the
Nation’s Patent Cases, MOTHERBOARD (May 5, 2016), https://motherboard.vice
.com/en_us/article/aek3pp/the-small-town-judge-who-sees-a-quarter-of-the
-nations-patent-cases. Non-practicing entities, also known as patent trolls, “buy
up patents for the sole purpose of suing other companies for infringement.” Id.
From a patent troll’s perspective, if a district is an appropriate venue, is known
to be highly patent-plaintiff-friendly, and quickly resolves disputes, it makes
sense to file suit in that district to enhance chances of winning the case or forcing the defendant to settle. See id.
11. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1584
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
12. See Brian Howard, Patent Litigation Trends in the Three Months After
T.C. Heartland, LEX MACHINA: LEGAL TRENDS (Oct. 18, 2017), https://
lexmachina.com/patent-litigation-trends-in-the-three-months-after-t-c
-heartland; Rogers, supra note 10.
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due to plaintiff-friendly local rules and relatively quick dispositions.13 In order to limit this forum-shopping, the Federal Circuit
in In re Cray Inc.14 and the Supreme Court in TC Heartland LLC
v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC15 have drastically reduced acceptable venue locations in infringement actions.16 This removed
many suits from the Eastern District17 but was also an overcorrection; it excessively limited forum choices for patent plaintiffs.
Because § 1400(b)’s text lacks nuance,18 the courts are incapable,
as a matter of statutory interpretation, of striking an appropriate balance between limiting forum-shopping and giving patent
plaintiffs meaningful choice in where to file infringement suits.19
A new balance must be struck, and a new statute is the best way
to accomplish that.
This Note attempts to strike that balance by writing that
statute. On the one hand, plaintiffs are entitled to meaningful
choice of forum and minimal inconvenience of being forced to litigate in the defendant’s home forum.20 On the other, defendants
should have reasonable certainty in where they can be sued for
infringement and should not be forced to litigate in far-flung forums.21 Our increasingly technology-based society has made
finding the balance difficult, and this Note also addresses how
technology has made striking the balance more complex. Part I
compares patent venue and general-purpose venue and examines case law interpreting § 1400(b). Part I also describes postTC Heartland judicial interpretations of § 1400(b). Part II discusses how modern technologies may interact with and compli-

13. Rogers, supra note 10.
14. 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent infringement cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012).
15. 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
16. See id. at 1521; Cray, 871 F.3d at 1360–64.
17. See Howard, supra note 12 (showing clear trends indicating a decrease
in patent infringement suits filed in the Eastern District following TC Heartland, as well as an increase in motions to transfer).
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (“[A] patent infringement [suit] may be
brought . . . where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed
acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”).
19. For this Note’s approach to striking that balance, see infra Part III.
20. See generally Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) (discussing the balance between plaintiffs’ and defendants’ interests in forum analysis).
21. See generally World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
297 (1980) (holding that defendants have a right to be subject to a court’s personal jurisdiction only where they “reasonably anticipate” suit).

1528

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:1523

cate the venue analysis, demonstrates the inconsistencies created by the post-TC Heartland case law, and outlines and critiques a recent legislative proposal to amend § 1400(b). Part III
discusses factors that should be considered in a modern patent
venue analysis and proposes a model patent venue statute to
provide fair venue options in an infringement action.
I. VENUE, INTERPRETATIONS OF § 1400(B), AND HOW
MODERN TECHNOLOGY MAY AFFECT PATENT VENUE
ANALYSIS
Although the text of the patent venue statute has not
changed materially since 1897,22 interpretations of it have varied substantially since then.23 VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas
Appliance Co. allowed the uneven distribution of patent suits by
permitting venue in any district where the court had personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.24 Eventually, the judiciary tried
to solve this problem25 by narrowing the scope of § 1400(b), but
it has overcorrected.
Section A briefly describes the statutory provisions governing venue generally and in infringement actions. Section B examines judicial interpretations of the statute and discusses
§ 1400(b)’s differences from the general venue statute.26 Section

22. See Wydick, supra note 9, at 558. Compare Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395,
29 Stat. 695 (“[I]n suits brought for the [patent] infringement . . . the circuit
courts . . . shall have jurisdiction, in law or in equity, in the district of which the
defendant is an inhabitant, or in any district in which the defendant . . . shall
have committed acts of infringement and have a regular and established place
of business.” (emphasis added)), with § 1400(b) (“Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides,
or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular
and established place of business.” (emphasis added)).
23. See Wydick, supra note 9, at 558–63 (describing major judicial interpretations of § 1400(b) through 1973). Compare TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods
Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1521 (2017) (holding that the “residence”
prong of § 1400(b) applies only to the defendant’s state of incorporation), with
VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1583 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (broadening venue to include any districts in which a court could obtain
personal jurisdiction over the defendant).
24. VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1583; see Rogers, supra note 10.
25. See Gene Quinn, Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Patent Venue Case
Filled with Patent Reform Implications, IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 14, 2016), http://
www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/12/14/supreme-court-patent-venue-case-patent
-reform-implications/id=75751 (“Ultimately, the question that . . . the Supreme
Court [will] address is whether the Eastern District . . . is a proper venue for
patent owners to be choosing.”).
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2012). This Note is primarily concerned with cor-

2019]

PATENT VENUE STATUTE

1529

C describes the post-TC Heartland venue landscape and the case
law that developed in its wake.
A. VENUE GENERALLY AND IN INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS
Venue is a physical, geographical location in the United
States where a given civil action may be filed.27 The general
venue statue, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (hereinafter § 1391), governs
venue in most cases filed in federal court.28 Section 1391 provides for relatively broad venue options; for example, under
§ 1391(b)(2), a civil action may be brought in the district where
the cause of action arose.29 When a suit is brought in a district
where the governing venue statute does not provide for venue,
that forum is “improper.”30 However, venue in infringement actions is not controlled by the general venue statute, § 1391, but
by a specific patent venue provision, § 1400(b).
Under § 1400(b), venue is proper in the district where the
defendant “resides,”31 and any district where the defendant commits “acts of infringement” and has a “regular and established
place of business.”32 The Supreme Court has settled the scope of
the “residence” prong,33 and the Federal Circuit has settled the
“regular and established place of business” prong,34 but that interpretation is producing inconsistent results.35
B. CONFLICTING JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF § 1400(B)
The Supreme Court has historically read § 1400(b) narrowly.36 Prior to TC Heartland, the Federal Circuit adopted a

porate defendants, not individual infringers, so unless otherwise noted, “residence” may be read as “corporate residence.”
27. See id. § 1390(a).
28. Id. § 1391.
29. Id.
30. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
32. Id.
33. See infra Part I.B.2.
34. See In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1361–63 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
35. See infra Part II.C.
36. See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct.
1514, 1521 (2017) (holding that the “residence” prong of § 1400(b) applies only
to a corporate defendant’s state of incorporation); Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957) (holding that § 1400(b) is the sole
statutory provision governing venue in patent infringement suits); Stonite
Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 563 (1942) (same).
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broader approach.37 Since § 1400(b) was enacted, each time the
Court has interpreted it, the Court has considered § 1400(b) to
be the only provision governing patent venue.38 Before TC Heartland, when the Court considered § 1400(b), because a corporation inhabited or resided only in its state of incorporation for
venue purposes,39 the “residence” prong of § 1400(b) was narrow
in scope. The circuit courts which addressed the “regular and established place of business” language maintained a similarly restrictive interpretation of the language.40 This Section discusses
several of these judicial interpretations of the patent venue statute leading up to TC Heartland.
1. The Federal Circuit’s “Regular and Established Place of
Business” Case Law
After VE Holding, decided in 1990 (and pre-TC Heartland),
because the defendant was deemed to reside anywhere the court
could obtain personal jurisdiction, the “regular and established
place of business” prong was rarely litigated.41 Prior to the establishment of the Federal Circuit in 1982, however, these cases
were often litigated.42 One illustrative decision of the analysis
used in interpreting the “regular and established place of business” language is In re Cordis Corp.43 In Cordis, decided in 1985,
the Federal Circuit held that the proper test for determining
whether a “regular and established place of business” existed in
the district at issue was whether the corporate defendant did
37. See VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574,
1583 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
38. See, e.g., Stonite, 315 U.S. at 563.
39. See TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1518.
40. See Steven Pepe & Samuel Brenner, Implications of a Revitalized 28
U.S.C. § 1400(b): Identifying the “Regular and Established Place of Business”
for Patent Venue in the Internet Age, 33 TOURO L. REV. 675, 692–99 (2017) (cataloging circuit court interpretations of “regular and established place[s] of business”).
41. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
42. See Pepe & Brenner, supra note 40, at 692–99 (classifying the four types
of cases litigated under the “regular and established place of business” prong).
See generally Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96
Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (establishing
the Federal Circuit).
43. 769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Following TC Heartland, and prior to the
Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017),
Cordis was considered the best guide to how the Federal Circuit would interpret
§ 1400(b). See Free-Flow Packaging Int’l, Inc. v. Automated Packaging Sys.,
Inc., No. 17-cv-01803-SK, at 7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2017) (citing Cordis as establishing the test for a “regular and established place of business”).
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business in the district with a “permanent and continuous presence there,”44 not whether the defendant had “a fixed physical
presence in the sense of a formal office or store.”45 Because
Cordis met that criterion, the Federal Circuit denied the writ of
mandamus.46 Prior to TC Heartland, the Cordis “permanent and
continuous presence” test was the only Federal Circuit guidance
on the “regular and established place of business” prong of
§ 1400(b).47
In 1988, Congress amended § 1391(c)’s definition of corporate residence.48 This amendment had a drastic impact on the
scope of patent venue.49 Following the amendment to § 1391(c),
district courts split on whether Congress intended for the new
definition of “reside” in § 1391(c) to apply to § 1400(b).50 VE
Holding resolved that split. The Federal Circuit began by noting
that, on first reading, §1391(c)’s definition of “reside” overrode §
1400(b)’s definition.51 However, the Federal Circuit reasoned
that, based on the historical, narrow construction given to
§ 1400(b) by the Supreme Court, a narrow construction might
still be proper, despite facially broad language.52
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit disregarded this rationale
and reasoned that, absent any clear legislative intent to the contrary, the plain language of § 1391(c)’s definition of “reside” applied to § 1400(b).53 The Federal Circuit concluded that, because
§ 1391(c) defined residence as any district in which a corporate
44. 769 F.2d at 737.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., No. 17–379–LPS,
2017 WL 3980155, at *14 n.19 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017) (“Cordis is [the] best data
point this court presently has [on the ‘regular and established place of business’
prong].”).
48. See Pub. L. No 100-702, § 1013, 102 Stat. 4669 (1988) (“[A] corporation
shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal
jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.”).
49. See John A. Laco, Note, Venue in Patent Infringement Actions: Johnson
Gas Fouls the Air, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1107, 1107–08 (1992) (recognizing that
in VE Holding, the Federal Circuit “dramatically altered longstanding . . . law
by eliminating the patent venue statute’s independence from the general venue
statute”).
50. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1575
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (collecting several district court cases that were split on
whether or not the modifications to § 1391(c) applied to § 1400(b)).
51. Id. at 1578.
52. Id. This is likely a reference to the Supreme Court decisions in Stonite
and Fourco taking narrow interpretations of § 1400(b).
53. Id. at 1581.
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defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction, the test for venue
under § 1400(b) was the same.54 For more than twenty-five
years, patent venue was effectively coextensive with general
venue and could be obtained anywhere the defendant was “doing
business”55 and thus subject to the personal jurisdiction of the
court in the district the suit was filed.56 This permitted the excessive forum shopping that led to nonsensical distribution of infringement suits.
2. TC Heartland Settles § 1400(b)’s “Residence” Prong
After twenty-five years of overly permissive patent venue,
leading to massive forum shopping, particularly to the Eastern
District of Texas,57 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in In
re TC Heartland LLC58 to interpret § 1400(b). TC Heartland,
however, only addressed the “residence” prong of § 1400(b), not
the “regular and established place of business” prong.59 The only
issue in the case was whether Congress had altered § 1400(b)’s
meaning when § 1391 was amended in 1988.60 The Court recited
the rule of statutory construction that when Congress wants to
change the law in a substantial way, it usually gives clear evidence of its intent to do so.61 The Court found no Congressional
intent to change the scope of § 1400(b) in the text of § 1391(c),
and reaffirmed its prior jurisprudence of a narrow “residence”
prong.62 The result of TC Heartland was that, for corporate defendants, “‘reside[nce]’ in § 1400(b) refers only to the State of incorporation.”63 The Supreme Court thus maintained its longheld position that § 1400(b) is the sole statute governing venue
in infringement actions.64 TC Heartland had an immediate and
drastic effect: the number of infringement suits pending in the
Eastern District of Texas dropped sharply after TC Heartland
54. Id. at 1584.
55. Id. at 1583.
56. Id. at 1584.
57. See Howard, supra note 12; Rogers, supra note 10.
58. 821 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. TC Heartland LLC v.
Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
59. See TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1517. This was left for the district courts
and the Federal Circuit to decide.
60. Id. at 1520 (considering, essentially, whether VE Holding should be
overruled).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1521.
64. See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 229
(1957).
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was decided;65 prior to TC Heartland, the Eastern District of
Texas had over twice as many filings as the District of Delaware.66 After TC Heartland, the Eastern District had less than
half that of Delaware.67
However, the Federal Circuit followed TC Heartland’s restrictive approach too far when it interpreted the “regular and
established place of business” prong,68 and the pendulum of
venue in infringement actions has now swung from too favorable
to patent plaintiffs to far in favor of defendants. While the narrow reading of “residence” presents a bright-line, easy to apply
rule, a similar standard for the “regular and established place of
business” prong presents a more complex issue.69
C. THE POST-TC HEARTLAND LANDSCAPE
Following TC Heartland, the contours of patent venue were
unclear to both the district courts and parties before them.70 The
Supreme Court made the scope of the “residence” prong clear:
“‘[R]eside[nce]’ in § 1400(b) refers only to the State of incorporation.”71 What exactly the “regular and established place of business” prong meant, however, was unclear.
1. Raytheon’s Four-Factor “Totality of the Circumstances”
Approach to § 1400(b)
In Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc.,72 the Eastern District of Texas
recognized that courts and litigants were struggling with the

65. See Howard, supra note 12.
66. See id. (finding that in the first quarter of 2017, the Eastern District
had 312 cases filed, and Delaware had 129).
67. Id. (finding that in the third quarter, the Eastern District had 139 cases
filed, and Delaware had 212).
68. See In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
69. See Benjamin Anger & Boris Zelkind, Where Plaintiffs Are Filing Suit
Post-TC Heartland, LAW360 (July 7, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/
942115/where-plaintiffs-are-filing-suit-post-tc-heartland; Howard, supra note
12. For a discussion of the Federal Circuit’s current “regular and established
place of business” jurisprudence, see infra Part I.C.2.
70. See Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 3d 781, 794 (E.D. Tex.
2017), mandamus granted, order vacated sub nom. Cray, 871 F.3d 1355 (“It is
evident . . . that there is uncertainty . . . regarding the scope of the phrase ‘regular and established place of business.’”).
71. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514,
1521 (2017).
72. Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d 781.

1534

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:1523

Cordis “permanent and continuous presence” test73 in a technology-infused world74 and created a test to determine what constituted a “regular and established place of business” in the modern
era, derived from patent venue case law.75 In Raytheon, the court
noted that, since Cordis, technology had changed how businesses
operate, and that patent venue needed to adapt to the current
realities.76 Raytheon promulgated a four-factor, “totality of the
circumstances” test for determining whether a particular defendant has a “regular and established place of business.”77 The
four factors the court considered were: (1) the defendant’s physical presence in the district; (2) the defendant’s representations
that it is present in the district; (3) the benefits the defendant
receives from its presence in the district; and (4) the defendant’s
targeted interactions with the district.78 Each factor is explored
in turn below.
The first factor promulgated by the Raytheon court was the
“extent to which a defendant has a physical presence in the district, including . . . property, inventory, infrastructure, or people.”79 The court noted that while a physical place of business,
such as a “retail store, warehouse,” or similar facility weighed in
favor of finding a regular and established place of business, the
“lack of a physical building in the district is not dispositive.”80
However, it was nonetheless “persuasive.”81 Raytheon noted that
a requirement of a fixed physical location was “at odds with the
practicalities and necessities of the business community.”82 The
court also noted that other types of physical presence in the district might support a finding that the defendant had a regular
and established place of business in the district, including product inventory, demonstration equipment, property of the defend-

73. In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
74. See Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 794.
75. Id. at 794–99.
76. See id. at 796.
77. Id. at 796–99. Raytheon’s test was soundly rejected on appeal. See In re
Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017). However, it remains illustrative
of factors considered in venue analysis today.
78. Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 796–99.
79. Id. at 796.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 797.
82. Id. (quoting Shelter–Lite, Inc. v. Reeves Bros., 356 F. Supp. 189, 195
(N.D. Ohio 1973)).

2019]

PATENT VENUE STATUTE

1535

ant, and equipment or infrastructure owned or leased by the defendant.83
The second factor considered was the “extent to which a defendant represents, internally or externally, that it has a presence in the district.”84 The court accepted the reasoning that
where a defendant had, publicly, through advertisements and
the like, accepted a sales representative’s place of business as its
own, the defendant was then estopped from denying that it had
no place of business in the district.85 In the Raytheon court’s
opinion, if a defendant represented it was present in the district,
that representation weighed in favor of finding that the defendant had a regular and established place of business in the district.86
The third factor analyzed the benefits the defendant received from its presence in the district, namely its revenue.87 A
later case in the Eastern District clarified that this factor was
not simply that the sale of products in the district, without more,
gave the defendant “a regular and established place of business”
in the district.88 Rather, when the defendant receives substantial revenue from activities in the district, it suggests that the
defendant’s place of business in the district is “regular and established.”89 The court also made it clear that the benefits gained
must be derived from the defendant’s presence in the district,
not simply the state as a whole (if the state has multiple districts), and that there must be “specific probative details . . . regarding benefits” the defendant receives to support a finding of
proper venue.90
Finally, Raytheon looked to how the defendant targets its
interactions in the district towards customers for business purposes.91 These purposes included customer support, contractual

83. Id. (citing In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Hemstreet v. Caere Corp., No. 90 C 377, 1990 WL 77920, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 6,
1990)).
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting Chadeloid Chem. Co. v. Chi. Wood Finishing Co., 180 F.
770, 771 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910) (Hand, J.)).
86. Id. at 798.
87. Id.
88. Kranos IP Corp. v. Riddell, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-443-JRG, 2017 WL
3704762, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2017).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 798.
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relationships, and targeted marketing efforts.92 The court was
careful to indicate that nationwide marketing efforts that included the district were insufficient, under this factor, to weigh
in favor of a finding of a regular and established place of business; the defendant must “specifically target[] the distinct communities within a particular district.”93 Finally, activities like
goodwill efforts or brand strengthening projects, which might or
might not produce accompanying revenue, could also weigh in
favor of finding proper venue, as well as “business development”
expenditures and other “localized customer interactions.”94
The Raytheon court emphasized that none of the four factors
alone was dispositive, and that each case is highly fact-specific
and should be decided based on the totality of the circumstances.95 In essence, though the court did not actually apply the
test,96 Raytheon was intended to provide other district courts
with a lodestar to navigate the confusing waters of the “regular
and established place of business” test. While Raytheon’s test
was dicta, it was quite influential; several district courts noted
the test in determining motions to transfer under § 1400(b),97 as
did practitioners.98 However, the test’s influence was short-lived
as the Federal Circuit soon reversed Raytheon, holding that a
totality of the circumstances approach was incompatible with
the text of § 1400(b).
2. The Federal Circuit Weighs In on the “Regular and
Established Place of Business” Prong
After the district court’s denial of its motion to transfer in
Raytheon, Cray. Inc. sought and received a writ of mandamus
from the Federal Circuit.99 The Federal Circuit, in addressing
the petition, read § 1400(b) to require that defendants meet three
92. Id.
93. Kranos, 2017 WL 3704762, at *7.
94. Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 799.
95. Id.
96. The court believed that Cordis was sufficient to support the result and
that it was unfair to apply the factors where the parties were unaware of them.
See id. at 799 n.13.
97. See, e.g., Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Cook Grp. Inc., 269 F. Supp. 3d 229, 244 (D.
Del. 2017); JPW Indus., Inc. v. Olympia Tools Int’l, Inc., No. 16–cv–3153–JPM–
bdh, 2017 WL 3263215, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. July 19, 2017).
98. See, e.g., Shannon Bjorklund & Payton George, Recent Supreme Court
Case Triggers Spike in Patent Lawsuits, 11 MINN. CHAPTER FED. B. ASS’N: B.
TALK, Sept. 11, 2017, at 7.
99. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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elements for venue to be proper: (1) a physical place in the district; (2) that is regular and established; and (3) that is the place
of the defendant.100 The Federal Circuit emphasized that in determining “whether a defendant has a regular and established
place of business in a district,” there is “no precise rule,” and that
“each case depends on its own facts.”101 According to the Federal
Circuit, the three “requirements” are used to “inform whether
there exists the necessary elements [for venue], but do not supplant the statutory language.”102
First, the Federal Circuit held that a physical place in the
district was required and that Raytheon erred in holding that
such a place was not required.103 The court reasoned that such
an interpretation of § 1400(b) read the statute too broadly as it
“requires a … ‘building or part of a building set apart for any
purpose’ or ‘quarters of any kind’ from which business is conducted.”104 Per the Federal Circuit, “place of business” in
§ 1400(b) does not include virtual spaces or nonphysical communications.105 Because Raytheon’s approach would permit venue
to arise based on a virtual, nonphysical presence in the district,
it was improper.106 The court was careful to clarify that a “place”
did not have to be a “formal office or store,”107 but stated that
§ 1400(b) did require a “physical, geographical location” where
the defendant conducts business.”108 The Federal Circuit cited
Cordis for examples, including a defendant using its employees’
homes for the purpose of storing “‘literature, documents and
products’” or engaging a secretarial service “physically located in
the district to perform certain tasks.”109
The Federal Circuit then turned to interpreting “regular
and established.”110 Beginning with “regular,” the court stated
that “sporadic activity cannot create venue,” and that a business

100. Id. at 1360.
101. Id. at 1362.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 3d 781, 797 (E.D.
Tex. 2017)).
104. Id. (quoting WILLIAM DWIGHT WHITNEY, THE CENTURY DICTIONARY
732 (Benjamin E. Smith ed., 1911)).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. (quoting In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
110. Id.
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activity could be regular if it is conducted in a methodical, uniform, or steady manner.111 While no single act of business could
possibly be “regular,” a series of single acts could be.112 “Established” was next; according to the Federal Circuit, because the
root of “established” is “stable,” the place of business must be
permanent, settled, or fixed, not ephemeral.113 Based on this
analysis, while businesses may move their locations, the location
must be stable and established for some meaningful period of
time.114 On the other hand, if an employer transacts business
from an employee’s house, and the employee can move from the
district at their leisure without the company needing to approve,
it would be less likely that the place of business is “regular and
established.”115
Third, the court addressed the requirement that the regular
and established place of business in the district be that of the
defendant.116 Under the Federal Circuit’s reading, § 1400(b) requires that the place of business be that “of the defendant, not
solely the place of the defendant’s employee.”117 The defendant
is required to personally “establish or ratify the place of business;” the employee alone cannot.118 A key factor in determining
whether the place of business is of the business is whether the
business owns, leases, or “exercises other attributes of possession or control” over the real estate.119 In its analysis, the Federal Circuit noted that where a small business is operated from
a home, that home may make venue appropriate in the district
in which it is located.120 Relevant considerations for an employee’s home giving rise to venue might include whether a defendant “conditioned employment on an employee’s continued
residence in the district or the storing of materials at a place in
the district so that they can be distributed or sold from that
place,” as well as marketing or advertisements, but only to the
extent they indicate that the defendant itself holds out a place
for its business in the district.121
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. (citing WHITNEY, supra note 104, at 5050).
Id.
Id. at 1363 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1891)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Agreeing with Raytheon, the Federal Circuit reasoned that
the defendant’s representations of a place of business in the district were relevant to the venue inquiry, and stated that in determining whether the place of business was of the defendant,
courts could consider such representations as listing a place of
business on a website or telephone directory or has its name on
a building.122 The court cautioned, however, that the fact that a
defendant has advertised itself as having a place of business in
the district, or even has an office there, is not alone sufficient;
the defendant “must actually engage in business from that location.”123
One last factor was “the nature and activity of the alleged
place of business of the defendant in the district in comparison
with that of other places of business of the defendant in other
venues,” as such a comparison “might reveal that the alleged
place of business is not really a place of business at all.”124 The
Federal Circuit indicated that the purpose of this factor was not
to “scrutinize the ‘nature and activity’ of the alleged place of business” to judge the relative value of business conducted, but to
show that a defendant might have a business model which relies
on the use of home offices or similar, indicating that venue might
be proper in such districts.125 The last word on the subject was
that “in the final analysis, the court must identify a physical
place, of business, of the defendant.”126
These cases illustrate the necessity of a totality of the circumstances approach to patent venue analysis, particularly
when a company does not operate traditional brick-and-mortar
stores. It is easy to say that a brick and mortar store is a “regular
and established place of business.” But what about Uber’s cars—
Are they “regular and established places of business”? Bright
line rules in this sphere work well for companies that have stores
across the country: Apple, for example.127 But what if the company provides cloud-based services and has no “regular and established place of business”? As adaptability and flexibility are
the name of the game in the internet age, so too must § 1400(b)
be able to adapt and flex with technological change.
122. Id. at 1363–64.
123. Id. at 1364.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1364 n*.
126. Id.
127. It is clear that any Apple store would meet the Cray test for a regular
and established place of business.
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II. INCONSISTENCIES IN APPLYING CRAY AS A RESULT
OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATE THE NEED
FOR AN AMENDED § 1400(B)
The increasing effects of technology on our society have complicated many aspects of the law.128 These effects have been particularly acute in patent law. A legal field focused on technological innovation is likely to be more affected by changing
technology than other fields.129 This Part discusses how modern
technologies have given rise to patent trolls, and how their consistent forum shopping, as well as businesses’ use of computerized technology (and accompanying business practices) have
complicated patent venue analysis.
While Cray did not explicitly require that a “‘place’ . . . be a
‘fixed physical presence in the sense of a formal office or
store,’”130 that has effectively been the result.131 That, inordinate
confusion, and inconsistent results. This Part demonstrates why
the Cray approach is unworkable today. Section A provides background on patent trolls, largely responsible for the lopsided distribution of patent suits in the nation. Section B describes how
new technologies and business practices have complicated the
venue analysis. Section C considers the difficulties in applying
the technological changes discussed in Section B to the current
judicial interpretations of § 1400(b) and demonstrates that, to
cure the inconsistencies in patent venue, § 1400(b) must be
amended. Section D describes a current legislative proposal to
amend § 1400(b), and Section E criticizes that proposal as inadequate.
A. PATENT TROLLS HAVE LED TO INCREASING RESTRICTIONS ON
PATENT VENUES
One reason so many infringement suits were filed in the
Eastern District of Texas is its perceived patent-plaintiff-friendliness—a magnet for patent trolls.132 A patent troll is someone
128. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (recognizing
that cell phones have introduced substantial difficulties in applying Fourth
Amendment doctrines).
129. Cf. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 134 S. Ct.
2347, 2357–59 (2014) (applying the law of patentable subject matter to computer technology).
130. Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362 (quoting In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 737
(Fed. Cir. 1985)).
131. See infra Part II.C.
132. See Rogers, supra note 10 (noting several cases in the Eastern District
involving patent trolls and how patent trolls “overwhelmingly choose to [sue] in
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who holds or buys patents for the purpose of suing other companies for infringing those patents, “asserting” the patent; the troll
does not “practice” the patent.133 Patent trolls are generally
viewed as burdens on society, rather than providing anything
useful to the community.134 Patent trolls have largely operated
in the field of computer and software technology patents, fields
which are particularly susceptible to abuse due to extremely
broad and vague patent language.135 For instance, a patent for
“controlling [a] controllable application” on a computer136 led its
inventor to sue a veritable “who’s who” of Internet and technology companies, claiming over a billion dollars in damages.137
Software patents are particular goldmines to patent trolls,
as claims in software patents are often “overly broad, unclear . . . or both.”138 With unclear or overbroad patents, there is

the Eastern District of Texas”); see also Joe Nocera, The Town That Trolls Built,
BLOOMBERG VIEW (May 25, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/
2017-05-25/the-texas-town-that-patent-trolls-built-j34rlmjc (“[TC Heartland] is
also bad news for the [patent] trolls’ long-time venue of choice . . . .”).
133. Rogers, supra note 10.
134. See Paula Natasha Chavez, The Original Patent Troll, YOUTUBE (Jan.
28, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lOGoZFzHkhs (conceptualizing a
patent troll as a green man living under a bridge, jumping out at people desiring
to cross the bridge, and carrying a sign that says “Pay here to cross”). But see
Bryan L. Frye, IP as Metaphor, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 735, 747–48 (2015) (arguing
that patent trolls may actually improve the efficiency of the IP market and
should not be discriminated against in the patent system).
135. See Daniel Nazer, EFF to Court: Don’t Let Trolls Get Away with Asserting Stupid Software Patents, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 9, 2018),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/01/eff-court-dont-let-trolls-get-away
-asserting-stupid-software-patents (arguing that “the most abusive patent
trolling tends to come from trolls that own abstract software patents”); see also
Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Found. in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee and Affirmance, Gust, Inc. v. Alphacap Ventures, LLC, No. 2017-2414,
2018 WL 4653696 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 28, 2018) (No. 2017-2411), 2017 WL 8219098.
136. U.S. Patent No. 5,838,906, at [17] (filed Oct. 17, 1994) (issued Nov. 17,
1998).
137. Joe Mullin, The Web’s Longest Nightmare Ends: Eolas’ Patents Are
Dead on Appeal, ARSTECHNICA (July 22, 2013), https://arstechnica.com/tech
-policy/2013/07/the-webs-longest-nightmare-ends-eolas-patents-are-dead-on
-appeal (listing lawsuits against Apple, Google, Amazon, Disney, and others).
138. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD
HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 28 (2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/
657103.pdf; see James Bessen, The Patent Troll Crisis Is Really a Software
Patent Crisis, WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Sept. 3, 2013), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/09/03/the-patent-troll-crisis-is
-really-a-software-patent-crisis (describing one patent troll threatening to sue
“hundreds of smartphone app developers” over a patent that claims “[m]ethods
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risk that the patent claims more than the inventor has actually
invented,139 and thus may chill legitimate business conduct.140
When software patents were relatively new, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office’s standards for granting software patents
were relatively lax, and the Office granted large numbers of
vague and overbroad software patents, now of arguable validity.141 As more software patents were granted, the number of
trolls buying up those patents and attempting to assert them
against potential infringers also increased.142
One reason that patent trolls have been such a nuisance,
apart from their assertion of vague patents that could potentially
cover many legitimate practices, is the cost of patent litigation.
It is extraordinarily expensive to litigate an infringement action:
approximately $1.6 million through discovery, and nearly $3 million through disposition of the case, including trial and appeal.143
These costs increase when litigating in inconvenient or out-ofthe-way forums, like the Eastern District of Texas, the patent
trolls’ favorite hunting ground.144 Rather than spend so much
money defending a nuisance infringement action from a troll,
many defendants will simply settle the case;145 the cost of litigation is not worth it. Through their actions, patent trolls have imposed a substantial cost on the American economy, estimated at

and systems for gathering information from units of a commodity across a network”); Nazer, supra note 135 and accompanying text.
139. Patent applicants are required to disclose sufficient information to enable others to make and use the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). These
are the “written description” and “enablement” requirements for patenting.
140. Rack Blogger, New Report Shows Chilling Effect Patent Trolls Have on
Startups, VCs, RACKSPACE (Sept. 10, 2013), https://blog.rackspace.com/new
-report-shows-chilling-effect-patent-trolls-have-on-startups-vcs.
141. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 134 S. Ct.
2347, 2357 (2014) (holding that “generic computer implementation” is not patentable). For an example of a case where a patent was invalidated under Alice,
see Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond Inc., 123 F. Supp. 3d 557,
562 (D. Del. 2015) (holding “a method and system for processing payments for
remotely purchased goods” invalid).
142. See Bessen, supra note 138.
143. Chris Neumeyer, Managing Costs of Patent Litigation, IPWATCHDOG
(Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/02/05/managing-costs-of
-patent-litigation/id=34808.
144. See Nocera, supra note 132.
145. Jason Rantanen, Allison, Lemley & Schwartz on Patent Litigation, PATENTLYO (Oct. 14, 2014), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/10/allison-schwartz
-litigation.html (out of approximately 5,000 patent cases filed in 2008 and 2009,
only 290 were tried, and fewer than ten percent received any decision on the
merits).
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$29 billion in 2011.146 Given these significant “troll tolls,”147 and
the inability of Congress to pass comprehensive patent reform,148
it is perhaps unsurprising that the judiciary attempted to restrain patent trolls by limiting the ability to file suit in potential
nuisance districts.149 Under a more restrictive venue standard,
the Eastern District of Texas is a suitable venue for fewer suits,
resulting in fewer nuisance filings in a plaintiff-friendly “judicial
hellhole,”150 or at least suits that are easier to dismiss for improper venue. As such, although the question of whether an infringement plaintiff is a patent troll or not does not directly influence the venue analysis, patent trolls, their forumshopping,151 and the resulting accumulation of suits in the Eastern District have had a substantial impact on the recent restrictions on patent venue.
B. TECHNOLOGY COMPLICATES THE VENUE ANALYSIS UNDER
THE REGULAR AND ESTABLISHED PLACE OF BUSINESS PRONG OF
§ 1400(B)
Following TC Heartland, to obtain venue in a district where
the defendant is not incorporated, patent plaintiffs must rely on
the “regular and established place of business” prong of
§ 1400(b).152 Because modern technology does not affect a defendant’s state of incorporation, it is unlikely to affect venue
analysis under the “residence” prong. The effects of modern technology on the “regular and established place of business” prong,

146. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 408 (2014) (analyzing the “legal costs, settlement costs, and other costs for resolved lawsuits” of patent troll suits); see Brian
Howard, 2016 Fourth Quarter Litigation Update, LEX MACHINA: LEGAL TRENDS
(Jan. 12, 2017), https://lexmachina.com/q4-litigation-update (compiling data on
the number of infringement suits filed on a year-by-year and quarterly basis).
147. See It’s Always Sunny in Philadelphia: The Nightman Cometh (FX television broadcast Nov. 20, 2008) (discussing reasons to pay a troll toll).
148. Lionel M. Lavenue et al., A Sign of Targeted Patent Reform in Congress?, LAW360 (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/906010 (documenting congressional attempts and failures to pass patent reform).
149. See supra Parts I.B.2, I.C.2.
150. See Eastern District of Texas, JUD. HELLHOLES, http://www
.judicialhellholes.org/2011-12/eastern-district-of-texas (last visited Nov. 17,
2018).
151. See Pepe & Brenner, supra note 40, at 675–76.
152. See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct.
1514, 1521 (2017) (“residence” in § 1400(b) applies only to the state of incorporation).
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however, may be monumental, and have already begun to produce inconsistent venue determinations.153 The “regular and established place of business” provision was, during the period between VE Holding and TC Heartland, rarely litigated.154
Because § 1400(b) remains textually sparse, courts are forced to
confront the unclear applications of “regular and established”
and “place of business” to the internet age.155 The “regular and
established place of business” prong was often litigated prior to
VE Holding, developing a substantial body of case law,156 but
with the advent of modern technology, analogies between past
and present practices may be difficult to draw. In particular,
many business practices have changed radically due to technology, many of which involve technological facilitation of interactions between companies and their customers. There is one particular business model in which the issues raised by modern
technology in the area of patent venue are particularly salient:
the Uber Model.157
The Uber Model is a symptom of the longstanding and unceasing effort to cut costs by the relatively new practice of hiring
contractors, rather than employees,158 but it is facilitated by the
ubiquity of smartphones in modern society.159 The smartphone
153. This Note assumes that in cases involving the “regular and established
place of business” prong, § 1400(b)’s requirement that “acts of infringement” occur in the district will be satisfied. See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012). The issue
may be more complex in reality.
154. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., No. 17-379-LPS,
2017 WL 3980155, at *14 n.19 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017) (“Cordis is [the] best data
point this court presently has [on the ‘regular and established place of business’
prong.]”).
155. The Federal Circuit has already addressed the meaning of this second
portion of § 1400(b) in light of TC Heartland and interpreted it very narrowly.
See In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017). For this Note’s discussion of
Cray, see supra Part I.C.2. This narrow interpretation still leads to confusion,
however. See infra Part II.C.
156. See Pepe & Brenner, supra note 40, at 692–99 (describing recurring fact
patterns).
157. See id. at 703–04. For other business practices that may present similar
issues, see id. at 704–05.
158. Cf. William W. Hurst, Are Uber Drivers Employees or Independent Contractors?, BEST LAW. (June 15, 2017), https://www.bestlawyers.com/article/uber
-drivers-employees-or-not/1415 (an Uber driver earns approximately sixty percent of federal minimum wage and is thus cheaper than an actual employee).
See generally Joshua Greenberg, “Uber” Uncertainty: Why Courts Are IllEquipped to Determine Compensability in a Gig Economy, DE NOVO (Oct. 25,
2017), http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/2017/10/uber-uncertainty (discussing the employee versus contractor dichotomy).
159. The model is also potentially highly susceptible to software patent
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is integral at every step of the user/driver interaction: the user
calls and pays for the Uber on his smartphone; the driver, using
her personal car, not Uber’s, uses her phone to accept the call,
and to navigate to the pickup and drop-off points. In the Uber
Model, the corporate defendant is generally incorporated in one
district and physically located in another,160 but has employees
or contractors who act or transact business under color of the
corporation’s name across the nation.161 In cities like New York,
Los Angeles, or Chicago, Uber drivers provide hundreds of thousands of trips per day, using their own cars, while Uber itself
collects substantial revenue at much lower cost than it would if
it owned the cars directly.162
The fact that “Uber, the world’s largest taxi company, owns
no vehicles”163 illustrates the point. Uber permits hundreds,
even thousands of drivers in cities and states across the country
to benefit from using its name. Uber earns a massive amount of
money from this practice,164 but it’s unclear whether the drivers
and their vehicles in one city or district constitute a regular and
established place of business. It is also unclear whether a company has a regular and established place of business when hundreds of drivers use a company’s name to make money from that
use, but the company does not actually own anything in the district.165 The cars are physical locations, but Uber probably does
not meet the Cray test based on the cars. Unless Uber purchases
the cars for the drivers, they likely have not “established” the
trolls, as defendants using the Uber Model are often software and app-based
businesses.
160. For example, Uber is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in
San Francisco. See Uber Techs., Inc., Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities
(Form D) (Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1543151/
000154315114000001/xslFormDX01/primary_doc.xml; Company Info, UBER,
https://www.uber.com/newsroom/company-info (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
161. See Pepe & Brenner, supra note 40, at 703.
162. See Artyom Dogtiev, Uber Revenue and Usage Statistics 2017, BUS.
APPS (July 23, 2018), http://www.businessofapps.com/data/uber-statistics
(Uber provides over 200,000 trips per day in New York City).
163. Tom Goodwin, The Battle Is for the Customer Interface, TECHCRUNCH
(Mar. 3, 2015), https://beta.techcrunch.com/2015/03/03/in-the-age-of
-disintermediation-the-battle-is-all-for-the-customer-interface.
164. Uber’s revenue in 2016 topped $6.5 billion. Reuters, Here’s How Much
Uber Made in Revenue in 2016, FORTUNE (Apr. 14, 2017), http://fortune.com/
2017/04/14/uber-revenue-2016.
165. The commentators are unsure whether this is sufficient to make venue
appropriate. See Pepe & Brenner, supra note 40, at 704. This is another argument in favor of Congress legislating on the point. Section 1400(b)e provides no
guidance in such a situation.
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cars in the district sufficiently.166 Section 1400(b) does not, indeed cannot, provide sufficiently clear guidance on the issue.
These issues are not addressed in prior case law, and could not
have been contemplated when § 1400(b) was enacted. As a result, judicial attempts to answer these questions are unlikely to
produce a workable balance.
Because of modern, technologically-influenced business
practices that may be completely different from business practices envisaged by Congress when § 1400(b) was enacted, application of § 1400(b) today raises substantially more questions
than answers, and the answers that have been supplied are inconsistent at best.
C. INCONSISTENCIES PRODUCED BY APPLYING CRAY IN THE
MODERN WORLD
There have been nearly sixty motions to transfer venue in
infringement actions decided under Cray;167 in only seven cases
has venue been found proper under the Cray test.168 In those
cases, there have been wide variations in what constituted the
defendant’s place of business. Some decisions have been clear: In
one case, FedEx operated several stores in the district, which
clearly constituted a regular and established place of business;169

166. See In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also supra
Part I.C.2. It is questionable whether the cars would also be considered “places
of business.” See supra Part I.C.2.
167. Case count provided by author as of September 13, 2018.
168. See, e.g., Seven Networks, LLC v. Google, LLC, 315 F. Supp. 3d 933,
966–67 (E.D. Tex. 2018); RegenLab USA LLC v. Estar Techs. Ltd., No. 16-cv08771, 2018 WL 3910823, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2018) (granted with respect
to one defendant; denied with respect to a second); Bd. of Regents of the Univ.
of Tex. v. Medtronic PLC, No. A-17-CV-0942-LY, 2018 WL 2353788, at *2–3
(W.D. Tex. May 17, 2018), vacated in part on reconsideration by No. A-17-CV0942-LY, 2018 WL 4179080 (W.D. Tex. July 19, 2018); GEODynamics, Inc. v.
DynaEnergetics US, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00371-RSP, 2017 WL 6452803, at *1 (E.D.
Tex. Dec. 18, 2017); Plexxikon Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., No. 17-cv-04405HSG, 2017 WL 6389674, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2017); Intellectual Ventures II
LLC v. FedEx Corp., No. 2:16-CV-00980-JRG, 2017 WL 5630023, at *6–7 (E.D.
Tex. Nov. 22, 2017); Am. GNC Corp. v. ZTE Corp., No. 4:17CV620, 2017 WL
5157700, at *1–2 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2017), mandamus granted, order vacated
sub nom. In re ZTE (USA) Inc., 890 F.3d 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
169. Intellectual Ventures, 2017 WL 5630023, at *6.
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in another case, the defendant operated a call center in the district;170 in a third case, the defendant had a manufacturing facility and a research facility in the district;171 in a fourth case, the
defendant had established a research facility in the district with
its name on the building, representing that the facility was its
place of business.172 However, under Cray, not all cases have
been so straightforward. In one case, testimony that the defendant would be relocating a distribution facility into the district,
given at trial in a separate infringement action, was sufficient to
establish a regular and established place of business in the district.173 In another case, the court held that server space leased
in the district was sufficient to provide venue.174
The recent case law on what is not a “regular and established place of business” has also been unclear. Data stored on
leased servers in the district for the purpose of improving service
to customers in the district may or may not be sufficient.175 Selling thousands of products in the district and having employees
regularly service those products in the district is also insufficient.176
These cases demonstrate the inconsistency produced by the
Federal Circuit’s requirement of a “physical place, of business, of
the defendant,”177 and how the Federal Circuit’s attempt to simplify the venue analysis has been unsuccessful. Where (apparently unsubstantiated) trial testimony that a place of business
170. Am. GNC, 2017 WL 5157700, at *1. The accuracy of the information
provided at trial has now been called into question based on information not in
the district court’s opinion. See ZTE, 890 F.3d at 1010, 1015–16.
171. Plexxikon, 2017 WL 6389674, at *2.
172. Bd. of Regents, 2018 WL 2353788, at *3.
173. GEODynamics, 2017 WL 6452803, at *1. The opinion does not state
whether the facility was actually established. Compare id., with In re Cray Inc.,
871 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (requiring that the place of business “for a
meaningful time period be stable, established”). While unstated, the court may
have relied upon an estoppel theory to hold the plaintiffs to representations they
had made in the other case. For a discussion of estoppel applied to determining
patent venue, see infra Part III.A.3.
174. Seven Networks, LLC v. Google LLC, 315 F. Supp. 3d 933, 949, 965–66
(E.D. Tex. 2018).
175. Compare id. at 965 (finding a “place of business” in leased server rooms
while acknowledging that such spaces “may not, on their own, establish proper
venue”), with Pers. Audio, LLC v. Google, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 3d 922, 933–35
(E.D. Tex. 2017) (holding that leased servers did not constitute a regular and
established “place of business”).
176. Lites Out, LLC v. OutdoorLink, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-00192, 2017 WL
5068348, at *2–4 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2017).
177. Cray, 871 F.3d at 1364.
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will be established suffices for venue, and having employees service thousands of products in the district does not suffice, there
is absolutely no predictability for litigants on either side.
The Federal Circuit admitted that the venue analysis is not
amenable to “precise rule[s]” and that “each case depends on its
own facts.”178 Despite that statement, the Federal Circuit attempted to lay down a bright-line rule: Cray effectively demanded a brick and mortar store or office in the district.179 The
Federal Circuit’s desire to avoid a rigid rule gave way in the face
of statutory text that demanded one. The Federal Circuit’s admonishment of the Raytheon four-factor test for being “not sufficiently tethered to the statutory language”180 is correct. Section
1400(b) contains no language which would support the Raytheon
factors. The plain text of the statute does not permit such considerations,181 and where the text is clear, it is controlling.182 Regardless of its forum-shopping faults, VE Holding provided predictability for litigants: venue was broad and coextensive with
personal jurisdiction. In an attempt to reduce the breadth of
venue under VE Holding, the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit, in TC Heartland and Cray, destroyed that predictability
and replaced it with uncertainty and inconsistency. The scales
have tipped too far in an attempt to compensate—a balance must
be struck. Some uncertainty must be accepted in order to balance
the interests at stake. To provide plaintiffs meaningful forum
choice in infringement actions and limit the burden of litigating
in inconvenient forums, some uncertainty must be accepted.
Therefore, to alter the statutory analysis in a manner that can
effectively consider modern technology and business practices,
while cabining the uncertainty, a new statute is needed.

178. Id. at 1362.
179. See id. at 1364.
180. Id. at 1362.
181. See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012). Neither the “residence” prong nor the
“regular and established place of business” prong contain language any regarding Raytheon’s factors. See also supra Part I.C.2.
182. See United States v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929) (“[W]here
the language of an enactment is clear . . . the words employed are to be taken
as the final expression of the meaning intended.”).
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D. THE RECENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL TO AMEND §1400(B)
There has only been one recent proposal for amending
§ 1400(b),183 introduced by Senator Jeff Flake of Arizona.184
However, it died in committee.185 Senator Flake’s proposal
(S. 2733) made several changes to the present version of
§ 1400(b), but included tests similar to both the “residence” and
“regular and established place of business” prongs of the current
§ 1400(b), with minor modifications.186
The “residence” prong is amended to read “where the defendant has its principal place of business or is incorporated.”187
S. 2733’s modification of the “regular and established place of
business” prong clarifies that the defendant must have a “regular and established physical facility that gives rise to the act of
infringement.”188
S. 2733 provides several more methods of obtaining venue
in infringement actions.189 The first of these is any district in
which the defendant has consented to suit.190 The second is in a
district where the invention embodied in the patent was developed.191 The third is where either party in the suit has a “regular
and established physical facility” where it did developed the invention at issue, manufactured a product embodying the invention at issue, or uses a patented manufacturing process that is
at issue in the suit.192 S. 2733 also includes a provision which

183. Technically, there have been two, but the second proposal is omnibus
patent reform and incorporates the first proposal with only minor changes. For
the purposes of this Note, they are effectively identical and will be treated as
such. Compare Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016,
S. 2733, 114th Cong. (2016), https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/s2733/BILLS
-114s2733is.pdf, with H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 281B (2015).
184. S. 2733. As Senator Flake is retiring when his term ends in 2019, it is
unclear whether S. 2733 (or a new version of it) will be reintroduced. See Alex
Isenstadt & Kevin Robillard, Flake Announces Retirement as He Denounces
Trump, POLITICO (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/24/
flake-retiring-after-2018-244114.
185. See S. 2733 - Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of
2016, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/
2733 (last visited Nov. 17, 2018) (indicating that the bill was referred to committee on March 17, 2016 and noting no further actions).
186. See S. 2733 § 2(b)(1), (2).
187. Id. § 2(b)(1).
188. Id. § 2(b)(2) (emphasis added).
189. Id. § 2(b)(3)–(6).
190. Id. § 2(b)(3).
191. Id. § 2(b)(4).
192. Id. § 2(b)(5).
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provides that for foreign defendants not falling under any provision in S. 2733, § 1391(c) controls.193 Finally, S. 2733 provides
that, under no circumstances, can the homes of employees or
contractors working from home be used to support venue in their
home districts.194
S. 2733 indicates that at least some members of Congress
recognize that the current patent venue regime is not functioning properly, but it does not provide a complete remedy.195
E. WHY S. 2733 IS INADEQUATE
While S. 2733 is a good first step in updating § 1400(b), it
does not effectively address several issues inherent in patent
venue analysis in the twenty-first century. In some cases,
S. 2733 even represents a step backward from the current venue
regime of TC Heartland and Cray.
1. S. 2733’s Positive Aspects
S. 2733 provides several strong, concrete methods of obtaining venue in any given patent infringement action, which represents an improvement over the current patent venue regime.
These avenues also represent the judgment of at least one member of Congress as to appropriate considerations in the patent
venue analysis.
The “residence” prong amendments, while not changing the
analysis substantially,196 have a beneficial clarifying effect on
the analysis. The statute clearly states that an appropriate forum for litigating is the defendant’s state of incorporation,197 not
its “residence;”198 “incorporation” is a term that requires no interpretation, unlike “residence.” Further, there is already a Supreme Court test interpreting language identical to the “principal place of business” language in the corporate diversity
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).199 This provision also represents

193. Id. § 2(b)(6); see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3) (2012).
194. S. 2733 § 2(c).
195. Senator Flake introduced S. 2733 prior to TC Heartland. See CONGRESS.GOV, supra note 185. It is possible that if Senator Flake had introduced
S. 2733 after TC Heartland and Cray, S. 2733 may have been different.
196. Presumably, any “principal” place of business would also constitute a
“regular and established” place of business.
197. S. 2733 § 2(b)(1).
198. Id. § 2(c).
199. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). This is the “nerve center” test from Hertz Corp.
v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93 (2010).
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a compromise between solely the state of incorporation permitted under TC Heartland by “residence”200 and the VE Holding
personal jurisdiction standard.201
The explicit codification of consent in S. 2733 is also an improvement.202 In a sense, consent is not a new method of obtaining venue; even if venue is improper, if the defendant does not
raise the defense, it has consented to suit in that district.203 Explicitly codifying consent as a way to make venue proper, however, ensures that parties have notice that they can expressly
consent to be sued in a particular district, which may reduce litigation costs.
The provision for venue in a district in which “an inventor
named on the patent in suit conducted research or development
that led to the application for the patent in suit” is a change for
the better as well.”204 To take the Uber example again, assume
that the patent infringed in Chicago was developed in Chicago;
the inventor of the patent would be able to sue Uber for its infringement of the patent in Illinois federal court. Presumably,
the forum in which a patentee developed an invention is also a
convenient forum for that patentee to litigate an infringement
action.
S. 2733 also provides for venue where either party in the suit
has a “regular and established physical facility” where it did substantial research and development for an invention claimed in
the patent in suit, manufactured a product that embodies the
invention at issue, or uses a patented manufacturing process
that is at issue in the suit.205 This provision would establish
venue in a district in which any party in the action has a physical
facility in which either the invention or an infringing version
thereof was developed, manufactured, or used. To use the Uber
hypothetical once again, venue would be appropriate in the state
where the infringed patent was developed, as well as the state
in which Uber developed the infringing version. It would not be

200. See supra Part I.B.2.
201. See supra Part I.B.1.
202. S. 2733 § 2(b)(3).
203. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1) (stating that a failure to raise a defense of
improper venue under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3) results in a waiver of that defense).
204. S. 2733 § 2(b)(4).
205. Id. § 2(b)(5).
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proper, under that provision, in a district in which Uber merely
infringes the patent.206
Finally, S. 2733 includes a catchall provision for foreign defendants, ensuring that the courts have guidance for determining venue in cases where American inventors sue foreign infringers. This provision, permitting venue under § 1391(c)(3) permits
venue “in any judicial district.”207 This is sensible, as a foreign
defendant likely does not particularly care whether it is sued in
New York or Delaware, a foreign forum is still a foreign forum.
2. S. 2733’s Shortcomings
While several of S.2733’s provisions are a positive step forward from the current venue regime, the same cannot be said for
all of its changes. S. 2733’s modification to the “regular and established physical facility” prong restricts venue to physical
places of business giving rise to the infringement.208 While this
language does simplify the venue analysis by making the requirements clearer, this would narrow the range of possible venues even from the current restrictive Cray standard, as the facility must not only be physical, but also give rise to the act of
infringement. Thus, under Cray, a store which does not sell infringing products could give rise to venue, but under S. 2733, it
would not. S. 2733 would also exclude stores which sell products
made by an infringing manufacturing process, as the store itself,
the physical place of business, does not give rise to the infringement. While it may be appropriate to tie a defendant’s susceptibility to suit in a particular district to its infringing actions specifically, rather than its presence in the district generally,209 if
the defendant is present in the district, venue should not be denied based on technicalities. Indeed, if S. 2733’s “regular and established physical facility” language was the only method of obtaining venue, under S. 2733, a defendant might not even be
susceptible to suit in its state of incorporation, a concept soundly
rejected by over a century of venue jurisprudence.210

206. Although venue might be proper in that instance under another provision, the categories are not mutually exclusive.
207. S. 2733 § 2(b)(6); see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3) (2012).
208. S. 2733 § 2(b)(2).
209. See infra Part III.A.1; see also supra Part I.C.1.
210. See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct.
1514, 1518–19 (2017) (chronicling past judicial interpretations of § 1400(b)).
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While S. 2733’s provision for venue in districts where the
defendant developed the infringing version is a good step forward,211 the next two provisions regarding where the defendant
manufactures a tangible product embodying the invention or implements a patented process212 suffer from serious defects. These
provisions are clearly aimed at creating venue where acts of infringement occur. However, these provisions ignore the existence of software patents or other patents that do not have physical embodiments, unless the infringing version was developed
in the district. Under this language, if Uber developed an infringing version of a software patent in Canada and distributed
it electronically, venue could not be properly obtained anywhere.
Finally, S. 2733 provides that under no circumstances shall
“[t]he dwelling or residence of an employee or contractor of a defendant who works at such dwelling or residence . . . constitute
a regular and established” place of business sufficient to meet
the requirements for venue.213 This would categorically prohibit
venue from being established by sales representatives or telecommuters in the district, even if those sales representatives or
telecommuters are, by their actions, directly or contributorily infringing or inducing infringement. In the Uber Model, this would
likely prevent venue from being proper based on drivers in the
district. It is a logical step from excluding sales representatives
or telecommuters from venue analysis to excluding Uber drivers.
This exemption could easily further limit Cray, an already narrow conception of venue. Cray was careful to note that if a sales
representative or other employee of the defendant (like a telecommuter or Uber driver) maintained a “physical place, of business, of the defendant” in the district, venue was proper.214 Per
S. 2733, under no circumstances would this be permitted.215 The
statute would also exclude a store which sells products manufactured using an infringing process, but not stores which sell items
which infringe simply by existing, a thin difference. In order to
rectify these potential escape routes for defendants in infringement actions, Congress should amend § 1400(b) to include both
concrete methods of obtaining venue, as well as a totality of the
circumstances test that explicitly allows courts to consider factors not included in S. 2733.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

S. 2733 § 2(b)(5)(A).
Id. § 2(b)(5)(B), (C).
Id. § 2(c).
In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
S. 2733 § 2(b).
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III. HOW § 1400(B) CAN BE MODIFIED TO PROVIDE FOR
PROPER VENUE IN A MODERN WORLD
Other than its recodification as § 1400(b) in 1948,216 the patent venue statute has barely changed since its enactment in
1897.217 In contrast, the world has changed dramatically. When
§ 1400(b) was originally enacted in 1897, airplanes did not yet
exist. A statute written in 1897 will have difficulty being applied
to a technological field of law over a century later. Patent venue
is a statutory creation and, as far as statutes go, § 1400(b) does
not say much. Because Cray is correct in its restrictive interpretation,218 the only way to make § 1400(b) broader (and flexible
enough to apply to twenty-first century technology) is for Congress to amend it. To properly address current complex venue
considerations, a more adaptable statute is needed: a multifactor, totality of the circumstances approach. Raytheon was a step
in the right direction, but the totality of the circumstances approach used was unsupported by § 1400(b)’s text.219 An amended
statute should explicitly include factors that, in light of the totality of the circumstances, make venue appropriate in any particular district, as well as providing several concrete avenues to
make venue appropriate and to simplify the analysis where possible.220
Section A lays out the factors a statute must consider in
remedying S. 2733’s defects. Section B proposes a Model Patent
Venue Statute (MPVS) to incorporate these factors, and demonstrates how the MPVS creates a workable balance between the
current regime of TC Heartland and Cray, and VE Holding’s
past failure.

216. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 87, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 936.
217. Compare Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695, with 28
U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012).
218. See supra Part I.C.2.
219. See In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (criticizing
Raytheon for departing from the text of § 1400(b)).
220. Of course, any multi-factor “standard” is subject to potential abuse by
judges or litigants, see Rogers, supra note 10, but strict appellate review, which
the Federal Circuit has demonstrated it is capable of providing, see Cray, 871
F.3d 1355, can minimize the issue. This Note’s proposed statute is modeled in
part on the codification of the fair use defense in copyright law. See 17
U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (providing a list of four factors to be considered in determining whether a defense of fair use in a copyright infringement action succeeds).
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A. FACTORS A MODERN PATENT VENUE STATUTE SHOULD
CONSIDER
In today’s digitally connected world, Cray’s brick-and-mortar requirement for a “regular and established place of business”221 cannot capture the necessary nuance to provide fair
venue options. Consider the Uber Model, discussed above.222 Assume Uber infringes a patent in Chicago (to its substantial benefit). Assume also that the owner of that patent is also located in
Chicago, and that the patent was developed in Chicago. Finally,
assume that Uber is incorporated in Delaware and only meets
the Cray test in California, where it is headquartered. Section
1400(b), per Cray, mandates that that patent owner litigate in
either California or Delaware, which is of questionable fairness
to the patentee.223 Or, consider Amazon. Amazon provides cloud
webservices for companies from physical server locations in various districts across the country, primarily Washington state.224
Cray says that no company alleging that infringement is performed by (or on) those servers can sue the defendant in Washington—any physical place of business based on those web servers is not established by the defendant: it’s established by
Amazon. In order to prevent such unfairness, several considerations should be taken into account in the venue determination.
1. The Benefit the Defendant Receives from Infringement
Within the District
The Raytheon court considered one of its four factors to be
the benefit the defendant receives from its presence in the district.225 However, a more proper consideration is the benefit the
defendant receives from acts of infringement in the district. Under the “regular and established place of business” prong, the
defendant is not subject to suit in a district because it is incorporated there; it is being sued for its acts of infringement in that
district. This approach is embodied in the current § 1400(b)
221. See Cray, 871 F.3d at 1360 (“[T]here must be a physical place in the
district.”).
222. See supra Part II.B.
223. Under S. 2733, this would not occur as the development provision would
permit suit in Illinois. However, S. 2733 was introduced before both TC Heartland and Cray and was clearly intended to restrict venue from the VE Holding
permissiveness. How Senator Flake (and the rest of Congress) feel about the
current venue regime is unclear.
224. See Pepe & Brenner, supra note 40, at 705.
225. Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 3d 781, 798 (E.D. Tex. 2017);
see supra Part I.C.1.
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which requires acts of infringement for venue to be proper, not
simply the defendant’s presence in the district.226 Under Amazon’s business model, assume that Amazon operates several web
services for a corporation in Washington, one of which is allegedly infringing. That corporation’s susceptibility to suit would be
judged based on the benefits the corporation receives from the
infringing web services performed in the district, not the noninfringing services. This factor ties the defendant’s amenability
to suit in a particular district directly to its acts of infringement
and benefits derived from that infringement. The more benefits
derived from infringement in the district, the more weight venue
in that forum is given.
2. The Presence of the Defendant’s Employees and
Contractors in the District
The presence or absence of employees and contractors in a
district is an essential consideration in patent venue in today’s
modern business world. This approach is already tacitly supported by both the current § 1400(b) and S. 2733.227 To again
consider the Uber Model,228 assume that all of Uber’s actual employees reside and work in California, but that Uber has several
thousand drivers in Chicago who are, with Uber, engaged in infringing a patent in Chicago. If the infringement is occurring in
Chicago, that infringing activity, and employees performing it,
would be a consideration in the venue analysis. Even if the current and proposed venue schemes had not endorsed this consideration, principles of personal jurisdiction also support it. Patent
infringement is a tort;229 where an intentional tort is committed
and expressly aimed at the forum, a court in that state has personal jurisdiction over the tortfeasor.230 Further, where a defendant has continuously and deliberately exploited a market in

226. See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012) (venue is proper in districts where the
defendant “has committed acts of infringement” and has a “regular and established place of business”); see also S. 2733, 114th Cong. § 2(b)(2) (2016) (requiring the regular and established facility to give rise to the acts of infringement).
227. See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b); S. 2733 § 2(b)(1)–(2). If a defendant has a regular and established place of business or principal place of business in a district,
it presumably hires or employs persons within that district.
228. See supra Part II.B.
229. N. Am. Philips Corp. v. Am. Vending Sales, Inc., 35 F.3d 1576, 1579
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (acknowledging that while patent infringement is a cause of
action created by statute, it is a “tort”).
230. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984).
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a state, “it must reasonably anticipate being haled into court” to
answer for its actions in that forum.231
Here, Uber is intentionally infringing the patent and distributing its infringing version to its contractors in the forum.
Uber has the intent that its drivers use the infringing version in
the forum, and thus that the injury be felt in the forum. Uber
would then be subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois, so
venue arguably should be proper as well.232 In fact, Chicago, being the third largest city in the United States,233 is a city in
which Uber might reasonably expect to be sued for infringing a
patent relating to its drivers. Or, imagine a company which has
many employees who telecommute to work every day, but in the
performance of their duties, these telecommuting workers infringe a patent in their home district, an infringement which the
company benefits from. Such employees engaged in infringing
activities would be a consideration in the propriety of venue in a
given district. Contrast this with Amazon’s web services: the
company hiring Amazon to perform computing functions would
have no employees in the district where the computing occurs,
which would cut against venue being proper. Thus, this provision would not always work to expand venue in cases where technology-based business practices are at issue.
3. Defendant’s Representations that It Is Present in the
District
The Federal Circuit has approved the consideration of the
defendant’s representations of its presence in the district under
the current § 1400(b).234 If the defendant makes out that it has
a place of business, or that it is present in the district beyond
merely “doing business” there,235 that representation would be a
consideration as to the fairness of permitting venue in a particular infringement action. In cases where a party is willfully led
to believe certain facts by another party, relies on those facts,

231. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984).
232. This would not limit the defendant from moving to transfer the case.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1404.
233. The 50 Largest Cities in the United States, POLITIFACT, https://www
.politifact.com/largestcities (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
234. See In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The district
court is correct that a defendant’s representations that it has a place of business
in the district are relevant to the inquiry.”).
235. This is the lower standard required to establish venue generally. Cray,
871 F.3d at 1361; see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).
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and injures himself as a result of those believed facts, the asserting party may not then turn around and claim that those facts
are untrue.236 In essence, the defendant would be estopped from
claiming that it did not have a “regular and established place of
business” in the district. Potentially relevant considerations under this prong would include “whether the defendant lists the
alleged place of business on a website, or in a telephone or other
directory; or places its name on a sign associated with or on the
building itself.”237
4. Defendant’s Targeted Interactions with the District in
Relation to the Infringing Activity
Another factor to consider is the extent to which the defendant targets the district with the infringing activity. As noted, the
defendant’s acts of infringement in a district are considered relevant to the venue analysis.238 Analogizing personal jurisdiction
again, a defendant’s ongoing business or contractual relationships in the district (for example, engaging in patent infringement) can subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction, even in
the absence of physical contacts.239 Personal jurisdiction and
venue require different analysis, and venue is generally more
difficult to obtain than personal jurisdiction,240 but a company
like Uber has physical contacts in the district: its drivers, who
are “a permanent and continuous presence” in the district.241
Suppose Uber advertises a new service in Chicago which infringes a patent. The advertisement of the infringing activity,
even if no one uses it, would weigh in favor of subjecting Uber to
suit in that district.242 If a defendant provides customer service
or technical support for infringing products or activity, or has
ongoing contractual relationships selling infringing products
into a particular district, that, too, would weigh in favor of venue

236. See MLB v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1076 (Fla. 2001) (describing the
law of equitable estoppel).
237. Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363–64.
238. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
239. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)
(“[W]e have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts
can defeat personal jurisdiction.”).
240. Logantree LP v. Garmin Int’l, Inc., No. SA-17-CA-0098-FB, 2017 WL
2842870, at *1 (W.D. Tex. June 22, 2017).
241. In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
242. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (“[W]hoever without authority . . . offers
to sell . . . any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”).
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being proper in that district.243 As noted above, the district
where the infringement occurs is where the harm occurs.244
Thus, it is appropriate for a dispute over the infringement to be
litigated in the district where the harm occurs.
5. The Defendant’s Relative Contacts Relating to
Infringement in the District Compared to Other Districts
This factor looks at the amount of the defendant’s contacts
in the district that relate to infringing activity in comparison to
the same infringing activity in other districts.245 In districts
where a business entity is committing greater infringing activity, it is more proper to subject the defendant to suit in that district.246 This approach is already contemplated in § 1400(b): “acts
of infringement,” not a single act, are required to make venue
permissible.247 Clearly, the framers of § 1400(b) intended that
more than simply a minor, passing act of infringement in the
district could give rise to venue. Taking the Uber Model again,
assume that Uber has ten times as many infringing rides in New
York City as it does in Connecticut. It would be more appropriate
to subject Uber to suit in New York than in Connecticut. Amazon’s web services are also instructive in this context. Patents on
a process, of which software patents are a variation, are infringed only when one entity performs all of the steps in the process.248 Amazon would perform all the steps by providing the web
services, which would subject the company hiring Amazon to liability249—the question would then be where venue is appropriate. If the company has hired Amazon servers in both Washington and Texas, but five times as many servers in Washington,
Washington would be a more proper forum.250
243. See id. (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, . . . or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”).
244. See supra Part III.A.2.
245. Limited discovery may be available for purposes of jurisdiction and
venue analysis. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 n.13
(1978).
246. This is not to say that the defendant would be immune from suit in the
district in which it engages in fewer acts of infringement, only that the fact that
there are districts where more or less infringing activity is present is a consideration in the venue analysis.
247. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012).
248. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. 797 F.3d 1020, 1022
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
249. Liability for infringement lies at the feet of the party directing the infringing activity. See id.
250. This assumes that venue could be obtained based on such web services
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6. The Location and Length of Time Where the Infringed
Patent Is Practiced
This factor gives more weight to a plaintiff’s forum choice if
they are actually practicing (not simply holding) the patent in a
particular district. This is intended to limit the ability of trolls
to harass defendants with suits in inconvenient or overly plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions.251 The court would consider the length
of time the patent had been practiced in the district at issue in
an effort to prevent trolls from practicing briefly in a plaintifffriendly district and then filing suit. In analyzing this factor, a
court would look for evidence that the patent is being practiced
in the district in which the suit is filed, and if it is, that would
weigh in favor of venue in that district. In a sense, this factor is
similar to S. 2733’s provision of venue in a district where the
patentee developed the invention.252 The location where the patent is practiced is presumably a district which the patentee has
contacts with and is a convenient litigating forum, similar to the
district in which the patentee developed the invention. For instance, if the inventor of the patent infringed by Uber as described above is operating a competing product or service in Chicago, that would weigh in favor of venue in Illinois.
However, the considerations outlined above are intended to
be neither exhaustive nor all required. A particularly strong
showing in one consideration should be able to balance a weaker
or nonexistent showing in one or more of the others. In this way,
the venue analysis would be like copyright’s fair use defense.
Fair use provides four factors for a court to consider in determining infringement.253 None of the four factors alone is required,
nor is any one alone dispositive. They form a holistic approach
to as whether, as a matter of fairness, the particular use of the
copyrighted material is actually infringement or not.254 The considerations are rooted in fairness, and the court should take into
being provided. Under this Note’s proposed statute, see infra Part III.B, venue
might be obtained. Under § 1400(b), venue would be improper.
251. See supra Part II.A.
252. Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016, S. 2733,
114th Cong. § 2(b)(5)(A) (2016).
253. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (listing four factors for the court to use to
determine infringement: (1) purpose and character of use; (2) nature of copyrighted work; (3) amount of copyrighted work used; and (4) effect on the market
for the copyrighted work).
254. See generally JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 563–650 (4th ed., 2015) (discussing the fair use doctrine generally).
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account the equities of the particular case in determining
whether venue is appropriate.255
B. A PROPOSED MODEL PATENT VENUE STATUTE TO STRIKE THE
BALANCE BETWEEN CRAY AND VE HOLDING
S. 2733 includes several excellent improvements and clarifications on the current incarnation of § 1400(b) but leaves several
potential gaps for defendants to avoid suit. In short, it does not
swing the pendulum back far enough—it is still too restrictive.
To remedy this and strike the proper balance between providing
defendants predictability in where they may be sued and giving
plaintiffs meaningful choice of forum, the following amendment
to § 1400 is proposed, adopting many of S. 2733’s proposed
changes, rejecting a few (principally, the categorical exclusion of
telecommuters), while also incorporating a multifactor equity
test:256
(b) In actions for patent infringement brought under 35
U.S.C. § 271, a civil action for patent infringement or an action for declaratory judgment of invalidity or noninfringement of a patent may be brought only in a judicial district—
(1) where the defendant has its principal place of business or is incorporated; or
(2) where the defendant has committed an act or acts of
infringement of a patent in suit and has a regular and
established presence that gives rise to the act or acts of
infringement; or
(3) where the defendant has agreed or consented to be
sued in the instant action; or
(4) where an inventor named on the patent in suit conducted research or development that led to the application for the patent in suit or where the defendant conducted research or development on an allegedly or
potentially infringing version of the patent in suit; or
(5) in the case of a foreign defendant that does not meet
the requirements of paragraph (1) or (2), in accordance
with section 1391(c)(3); or
(6) where the district court determines that, as a matter
255. The proposed MPVS in Part III.B makes this clear.
256. The current text of § 1400(b) would be stricken and replaced wholesale.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012). Similar language could be used for determining
venue in copyright infringement actions, currently codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(a).
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of equity, the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court for infringement of the patent in
suit;257 in determining whether the defendant is subject
to suit in a particular district, the court shall consider—
(A) the benefit the alleged infringer receives from acts
constituting infringement within the district;
(B) the presence of employees or contractors in the district who engage in acts of infringement or assist the
alleged infringer in acts of infringement;
(C) the defendant’s representations that it is present in
the district;
(D) the defendant’s targeted interactions in the district
regarding the infringing activity;
(E) the defendant’s relative contacts relating to the acts
of infringement in the district compared to such contacts in other districts;
(F) the plaintiff’s practice of the infringed patent in the
district in which the suit is filed;
The fact that any factor is missing shall not itself bar a finding that venue is proper if such finding is based upon considerations of the other above factors.
***
The Model Patent Venue Statute (MPVS) borrows the best
aspects of S. 2733, namely clarifying § 1400(b)’s language, codifying consent, and permitting venue where the invention was developed, while closing S. 2733’s loopholes, and adding a multifactor equity test based on factors tied to the defendant’s acts of
infringement and the plaintiff’s work on or with the invention in
the district.258 As paragraphs (1), (3), and (5) are taken verbatim
from S. 2733, the rationale for their selection requires no further
explanation.259 The remaining factors will each be further discussed and explained.

257. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
(discussing situations in which defendants should reasonably expect to be haled
into court in a given jurisdiction).
258. See supra Part III.A.
259. See supra Part II.D.
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1. Regular and Established Presence
Paragraph (2) of the MPVS represents a compromise between the current Cray standard permitting any regular and established physical place of business260 to give rise to venue and
S. 2733’s requirement that the place of business give rise to the
infringement. Paragraph (2) requires that the Defendant’s presence give rise to the infringement, but not that the presence be
a physical establishment. This ensures that a defendant is subject to suit in a district due to its acts of infringement, not merely
its presence in the district unrelated to those acts. This requirement is also provided for in maintaining § 1400(b)’s requirement
for acts of infringement to occur in the district. It is intended to
provide venue for defendants like Uber and companies hiring
Amazon’s computing services. For instance, Paragraph (2) can
provide venue in a district where Uber is infringing because the
acts of infringement occur in the district and Uber has a regular
and established presence in the district: the cars. While the same
drivers are not always driving for Uber in a given place at a given
time, there is no doubting that Uber has a regular and established presence in any major American city, and the cars are
where the business is transacted. Certainly, under Cray, Uber’s
cars would not be a defendant’s place of business, but unless
Uber removes itself from the district entirely, it will have a permanent and continuous presence in the district. A requirement
that the place of business be physical ignores the ability of companies to contract out computing services to corporations like
Amazon. The company using Amazon’s servers is transacting
business in the district where the servers are located, but the
company itself has no physical place of business in the district,
only Amazon does. Thus, to avoid the loophole, there should not
be a requirement that the facility be physical. Further, the requirement that the defendant have only a “presence,” as opposed
to a “place of business” may subject the company hiring Amazon
to venue.
2. Development or Production of a Patented Invention
Under S. 2733 § 2(b)(5), there is no provision for venue in a
district where the defendant is practicing a nonphysical patent,
other than where the infringing version was developed. This is a
glaring oversight. Many patents today are nonphysical, such as
260. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see supra Part
I.C.2.
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software processes or business methods. To provide any sort of
balance, such patents must be considered in determining venue.
S. 2733 makes the judgment that the production of a physical,
patented article, or the use of a physical manufacturing process,
is sufficient to give rise to venue in a district, but makes no provision for venue when the infringement involves the creation of
software or use of nonphysical patented processes. It is nonsensical for the one to be covered, but not the other; a patent is a
patent. A software patent is neither less nor more deserving of
the same protections as a patent on a physical invention. The
MPVS does away with this distinction for the practice of infringing articles and folds venue analysis for such acts under the multifactor approach.261 The MPVS, however, retains S. 2733’s provision for venue in a district in which either the patented
invention or the infringing version was developed. Here, if Uber
were to develop an infringing version of a software patent in New
Jersey where the original invention was developed in Pennsylvania, venue would be proper in either forum.
3. Omission of Limitation on Telepresence and Employee
Homes
A categorical ban on using the presence of telecommuters
and sales representatives to establish venue runs counter to over
a century of patent venue jurisprudence. Courts have long recognized that, under § 1400(b), the presence of a defendant’s employees in the district at issue can make venue appropriate in
that forum.262 Under the venue analysis, the infringing acts of
employees in the district at issue are relevant to the venue determination. Imagine a business with corporate headquarters in
New York. Engineers at this company telecommute to the headquarters from their homes in Connecticut and use their homes
as the company’s manufacturing space using technology such as
3D printers provided by the company;263 the company has no actual manufacturing space other than its employees’ homes.
S. 2733 would categorically ban these residences from being
used to create venue in Connecticut, even though the engineers
are performing activities that would give rise to venue under
261. See supra Part III.B.
262. See, e.g., In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 735–37 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (sales
representatives in the district were sufficient to provide venue). But see Univ.
of Ill. Found. v. Channel Master Corp., 382 F.2d 514, 516 (7th Cir. 1967) (finding
a single sales representative in the district insufficient for proper venue).
263. This could arguably satisfy the Cray standard for venue. Cray, 871 F.3d
at 1360.
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S. 2733 § 2(b)(5). The MPVS accepts no such limitations and
would fold such employees engaging in acts of infringement into
the venue analysis under (b)(6)(B).
4. Considerations of Equity
No statute ever written can possibly comprehend every situation that might come before a judge. Bright-line rules, like
Cray or S. 2733, provide a sort of objectivity at the cost of injustice in specific instances.264 Bright line rules, do, however, provide simplicity in application. For example, under TC Heartland,
the defendant’s residence is its state of incorporation—nowhere
else.265 Therefore, to provide for administrative simplicity where
possible, the MPVS provides concrete avenues for venue: state of
incorporation or principal place of business, where the defendant
consents to be sued, and where the invention or infringing version was developed. However, to ensure that plaintiffs are not
unfairly prevented from litigating in proper forums, and stripped
of their traditional right to choose the forum,266 the MPVS provides more flexible options. The heart and soul of these flexible
options is the multifactor equity test. The multifactor approach
incorporates the considerations described above267 into an analysis similar to fair use in copyright:268 each factor is weighed individually, and the court determines whether, in the instant
case, it is fair for the defendant to be subject to suit in the particular district.
The MPVS will likely be critiqued for an increase in forumshopping by patent plaintiffs and subject defendants to a higher
degree of uncertainty regarding where they may be sued by patent plaintiffs. The MPVS may be criticized for its potential for
judges to abuse the multifactor equity test to maintain patent
cases in their jurisdictions.269 There may also be concerns that
264. See United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1335 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., dissenting) (discussing the pros and cons of bright line rules).
265. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514,
1517 (2017).
266. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) (“[A] plaintiff ’ s
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed . . . [unless] the chosen forum would
[be inconvenient to the defendant] out of all proportion to plaintiff ’ s convenience.” (internal quotations omitted)).
267. See supra Part III.A.
268. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (providing a list of factors to consider in determining whether a defense of fair use in a copyright infringement action succeeds).
269. Cf. Rogers, supra note 10 (suggesting that some patent judges may have
an economic incentive to keep patent cases in their dockets).
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the adoption of the language of “reasonably anticipate being
haled into court,” the personal jurisdiction standard,270 may signal a return to the days of VE Holding. These concerns, however,
are misplaced.
Historically, choice of forum is reserved for the plaintiff,271
and the MPVS is in keeping with that jurisprudence. Concerns
of excessive forum-shopping are balanced by the benefits of giving plaintiffs meaningful choice of forum in patent suits and by
limiting their ability to be dragged from their own home forums
to validate their patent rights against infringers. While some
judges may be susceptible to economic pressure to maintain
cases within their dockets, the Federal Circuit has demonstrated
that it is willing to reverse such cases that are clearly erroneous
and an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.272 Finally, the language regarding a defendant’s reasonable anticipation of suit in
a particular district is qualified by reference to the specific patent in suit; it is less broad than the normal personal jurisdiction
standard. If the infringing version is not being employed in a
particular district, the defendant cannot reasonably anticipate
being sued in that district. Even if the text were facially as broad
as the personal jurisdiction standard, courts will give effect to all
provisions of a statute where possible.273 Thus, if the equity test
were as broad as personal jurisdiction, the other provisions
would have no effect.
The MPVS also recognizes that forum-shopping can be particularly problematic in the patent context,274 and seeks to limit
that forum shopping to areas where a defendant might “reasonably anticipate being haled into court.”275 Neither plaintiffs nor
defendants want to be forced to litigate in inconvenient forums,
but the MPVS strikes the balance in favor of the plaintiff who is
attempting to vindicate his patent rights over a corporation that
is potentially infringing them. Ultimately, balancing concerns of
270. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
271. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 241 (“[A] plaintiff ’ s choice of forum should rarely
be disturbed.”).
272. See, e.g., In re ZTE (USA) Inc., 890 F.3d 1008, 1015–16 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(remanding to the district court for consideration of factors that had previously
been ignored); In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (remanding for further analysis of the parties’ arguments).
273. This is the rule against surplusage. See Chickasaw Nation v. United
States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (noting that effect is given to each word, if possible, unless those words are inconsistent with the rest of the statute).
274. See supra Part II.A.
275. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
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public policy, such as the interests of litigants in infringement
actions is for Congress, not the courts.276
While this statute will substantially broaden venue options
for plaintiffs from TC Heartland and Cray, and likely encourage
some degree of forum-shopping in patent suits, as well as lead to
an increase in unpredictability for defendants, it is intended to
be substantially narrower than the VE Holding personal jurisdiction standard.277 The MPVS is designed to strike a balance
between the highly restrictive TC Heartland/Cray regime and
the extraordinarily permissive VE Holding, while also attempting to reduce litigation over venue where possible. Some degree
of forum-shopping and uncertainty in litigation is required to
give meaningful forum choice to plaintiffs in infringement actions, and the MPVS attempts to chart a middle course between
the two recent polar opposites seen in infringement jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
Even where statutes have remained effectively unchanged
for over a century, litigants still frequently dispute how they apply; § 1400(b) is one such statute. The judiciary has attempted
to refine the approach to patent venue analysis; however, as described above, their efforts have been unsuccessful in modifying
the patent venue scheme to a modern, interconnected world.278
A statue written in the nineteenth century is difficult to apply
when technology has engendered a radical paradigm shift in the
business practices the statute was intended to apply to. While
the actions of the courts have been successful in reducing forumshopping,279 the courts are unable to balance the scales of justice,
having overcorrected in their attempts. The MPVS attempts to
resolve the current problems with venue in patent actions by incorporating both concrete avenues for creating venue, as well as
an equity-based multifactor approach.280 This statute is intended to permit most venue decisions to be in keeping with the
need for administrative simplicity in application, as well as to
276. See Harris v. Harris, 424 F.2d 806, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“The public
policy on any matter is primarily for the lawmakers.”).
277. See VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574,
1584 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (describing the personal jurisdiction standard).
278. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
279. See Howard, supra note 12 (noting evidence that indicates a decrease
in the number of patent infringement cases in the Eastern District of Texas and
an increase in motions to transfer).
280. See supra Part III.B.
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provide an avenue for creating venue which takes into account
the interests of the parties in the action. This Note provides a
suggestion for how to strike that balance by combining concrete
avenues for venue to provide administrative simplicity and a totality of the circumstances equity test to ensure fairness in
venue selection in infringement actions.

